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SCHLEY ON THE STAND — The Admiral Testifies as to the Tart He Took in the Bat tle of Santiago. NARRATION OF A HISTORICAL EVENT. Interesting Account of the Eujraife iueut From the Time of Its Be ffiuuiu? Until the End. Scene. Before Clenfuego. Depleted and the Situation on III. Arrival Off Santiago Narrated by the Dis tinguished WltnrM. Washington. Oct. 25. — Adm. Schley Thursday took the stand in hi* own be half at the court of inquiry, which is In vestigating his conduct as commander in-chief ot the tlyuig squadron during the 6antiago campaign. He was summoned a few mlruite* after the court convened at 2 o’clock for the afternoon session, and when the court adjourned at 4 o’clock, he apparently had gotten well under way In his testimony. The admiral then In answer to his coun sel proceeded to give a careful and de tailed narrative of all the events of the campaign up to the battle of Santiago. He had not reached the stage of his tes timony where he will tell of the buttle, when the court adjourned for the day. w lien the court adjourned for the day many of the spectators pressed forward ami shook the admiral's hand. ‘ "I was a commodore,” the admiral be ?;an in response to Mr. Rayner's request or a narrative of the campaign, "and was ordered to command the Hying squad ron on the 2Mh of March, lvw. and served until the Sail day of June, of the same year. In tha’ capacity.” He had taken t onmuind of the squad ron at Hampton Roads, Va.. hoisting his flag on tlie cruiser Brooklyn. After re luting th<- organization of tlie squadron at the Virginia port, lie said that iie had kcalled the emmandlng oiiicers of the tVesH. :* e.instituting that squadron to gether ami then added: "The plan of the campaign was thresh ed out. I put the squadron immediately upon a war footing, established pickets and patrols and also the masking of lights.” "During this time I explained to all the commanding officers that as it would he Impossible to contrive a plan of battle that would meet unforeseen contingen cies. the general plan of the squadron would lie to crui-o- In line of battle and Its gen r a l principle would he to attack th<' lead and leading vessels, concentrat ing the fire upon them in order, first, to obtain the moral effect, and second, to throw them into confusion, making a vic tory over them probably very much more successful and complete. I did thnt for the reason that the older plans of battle had nil been to attack centers and rear, resulting in the escape usually of a part of each squadron. I felt that the attack of tlie head of a squadron, which was to » >me extent new. would Involve the de struction of the whole fleet, and that was the general plan of action as explained to them on that occasion.” On May 12 or 13 he received orders from the secretary of the navy to proceed to Charleston, S. C. The squadron arrived there on the liJth and found orders from the secretary dlrc*ctlng him to proceed to Key West and report to Commodore Re mey for further instructions. He went to the Florida port at a 12 knot speed, that being the highest all the vessels of the squadron could make. The squadron at the time consisted of the Brooklyn, Mas sachusetts. Texas. Scorpion and Sterling, the latter being a collier. The admiral said the Sterling was lost sight of the Hrnt night out and he never saw her again until he met her oft the south side of Cuba. The Hying squadron arrived at Key West on the 17th. the admiral thought, and on the next day h>« went ashore to pay his respects to Commo dore Remey, after having saluted his flag Continuing his narrative, the ad miral said: ’H hilst there the commodore showed me a telegraphic order from the honora ble secretary of the navy directing me to proceed with all dispatch to the block ade of Havana. He also showed me a number of other dispatches, the purport of which, I remember, but the contents I do not. I hastened off on my way to the ship in the afternoon. 1 thought I eaw the New York approaching. At all events, when I got on board, determining to go at once oft Santiago, the flagship had arrived and salutes were exchanged. 1 went on board to pay my respects and Blsi to talk over the situation with Adm Sampson. I found that the admiral was very much worn and necessarily so, be cause his responsibility had been very great. "He showed me a number of orders. Among them was one which stated that a division of the two squadrons had been decided upon, one for the north and the other for the south coast of Cuba. In which he was given the preference of command. The order, if I remember cor , rectly. stated that under any circum stances I was to remain with my com mand. and I asked him which of the two stations he would fake, and he said he proposed to hold the Havana or north one. He also told me that whichever side I went on to remember that they were very heavily fortified and that his confidential Instructions, 'which he deliv ered to me verbally, were that we were not to risk our battleships against the fortified places of the coast until after the Spanish squadron had been disposed of My recollection now Is that he told Hie it was at Curacoa. The Impression left on my mind was that It was some where in the Venezuelan gulf and that If was supplied with ammunition and stores destined to Havana, and that was un doubtedly the point It was to reach. He said his information was that the orders of the Spanish fleet to reach Havana or sotn« point iti railroad communication with it were imperative and that he be lieved and thought that f’lenfuegos would be th« point, as that came under the ac ceptation of the order m«*re directly. We looked over maps, und 1 must say 1 •(freed with him. "I told him that I had been ordered to report for duty to Adm. Itcmey and that I Imagined necessarily meant himself, and that l wanted to assure him at the out set that 1 should he loyal, absolutely and unreservedly, to the cause we were b oh representing. rapt. Chadwick, who w as prerent I do not remcmlw r whether all the time or not—said: ‘Of course, com fnodor*, any one who has known your character, would know that It would l»« Impossible for you to b<- otherwise than loyal.' 1 asked the admiral If there had been mtnblished any means of communi cation with the insurgents, whether there Were any pilots or whether any locality was known where they were to be found. He told me that he did not know*, but that when he got the situation lietter In band ho would communicate with me, but that he thought If would be better for me to start as early as we could get away and blockade Clenfuegos. I then went aboard my own flagship In order to hasten the operations of coaling. Whilst there, the Algonquin came out, bearing an order from the secretary of the navy, through Commodore Remey, directing me to go rtff Havana. I sig nalled to the admiral to know whether or not he understotal my orders were to go off Havana. He replied by signal that he understood that his coming to Key West modified my orders and that f should t>e prepared to carry otit the or ders we had agreed upon in the after noon I do not remember whether that was on that afternoon or In the morn ing, but it was before I left for Clen f llegOS." The next move of the present squadron was from Key West to Clenfuegos. Citna, • qd the admiral told how. as the ootn mander-in-chlef of that squadron, he had the vessels coaled. *«> that at 7 o'clock or 8 o'clock on the morning of May 1$ all the si’.ps of the fleet turned thejr backs upon American soil. This was d me under the order of the rommander-in-ehlef, Adm Sampson At this point the witness quoted Adm. Sampson's order No. &, not falling to point out as he went along, <hat in this order the admiral had twtJd: *'I have the situation wall in Aural and I will writs you and give you any In- ! formation that suggests Itself." The first ! of note on the voyage toward Clen fuegos occurred. Adm Sc hley said, after 1 he had been out from Key West three or 1 four hours. It was then that he had met i Capt. Me'alia In charge of the sub squadron with the Marblehead at its head, which had been doing duty on the (uba>. coast near Clcnfuegos. whither the commodore with his flying squadron was bound McCalla had sent the Eagle ; »n communicate with the flying squadron. Adm. Schley also mentioned that the ' Scorpion had been sent to intercept the Kagle for the purpose of securing what- I eve. information she might bring. "After a little." he said, "the Scorpion returned , .renortcd through the megaphone. 1 ; think, identically as Is reported in his ' log. which was all the information he gave us. The Kagle afterward pas«*d close enough to the Brooklyn to hail her by the megaphone and repeated that there was no news. I was on the quar- I ter deck. The thing seemed to be almost burned into my mind, but after what I have heard. 1 begin to think that may be I was mistaken." Adm. Schley placed his arrival off Clen Tuegos at near midnight of May 21. He told of hearing guns early that evening while still 30 or to miles distant from the Cuban port. "The fact of hearing these undoubted, so much so thut the officer of the deck spoke of It. I hap- ' pened to be there at the time.” He said that the fleet stopped for the night ten or twelve miles off shore off ♦lenfuegos and that he had sent the Scorpion ahead of the fleet as a patrol and that toward daylight on the follow ! morning. May 27. ail the ships had i in Close to the harbor entrance. | My recollection now Is." he said, "thut J'*’ within a mile and looked at the i harbor, but owing to trees and other ob I structlons it was impossible to sec into . e .aar^'r' 1 never saw any smoke ; !‘,a(‘|l!i and I whs a very close watcher on deck, generally from 8 o'clock in the ' ,lI,°rntnK until 12 or 1 o'cl.K'k at night. I here was scarcely a circumstance of any ; kind that escaped me.” The admiral said that after this In spection of the harbor he had taken a po sition with the fleet three or four miles I out. At li o'clock of the evening of tin* 22d the torpedo boat Dupont arrived with adlvces from Adm. Sampson. The dls paf( li referred to was the "Dear Schley" letter. Referring to this dispatch the | witness said: "I dlil not remember the fact until within the past few months Ixtuusc there was duplicates of that letter, but I now I recall from the lact that I sent the Scor pion to the eastward in obedience to the injunction contained in that letter to com municate witli tile scouts about w llO.Hti presence off Santiago I was very uncer tain, as I think the admiral was on ac count of orders having been sent direct ing them to proceed in the direction of the Spanish main to look for the squad ron. The admiral was not certain wheth er th< y hud got back, nor was l. There fore. I sent the Scorpion eust and that i tact flxed the receipt of that letter.” Doming to the blockade off i Mi nim gos [the admiral explained tin* formation of1 I his fleet there, saying that the steaming I which hud been mentioned in the logs was for the purpose of overcoming the effect of a current which set directly Into tin* bight. He said the ships were con stantly setting into the breuch and were obliged almost every hour to steam for a mile or two. "And that.” lie said, "ac counts for a good deal of what Is stated in the logs about steaming. We were closer at night, and that'” he said em phatically, was tile rule of the sgnudron always; we were closer at night at both < 'lenfuegos and Santiago. The idea of keeping the squadron In formation dur ing the night or in line of battle ready for any emergency was never abandoned." At this point Adm. Schley digressed for a moment to refer to the conversation he had had with Adm. Sampson before leaving Key West, widen hi* said hud in duced tin- belief that the Spanish squad ron's objective was Clenfuegos. The admiral then related the particu lars of the visit of Ideut. Wood, of the Inipont, to him. on board the Brooklyn when the Dupont arrived off (Meiifuegos. He said that Ideut. Wood was In u pitia ble condition of exhaustion because of his arduous duties on u torpedo boat. The admiral related how Ideut. Wood had handed him the dispatch and added: "I think he did me injustice when he spoke of my speaking disrespectfully of Adm Sampson as Capt. Sampson. I used no such term. There was no reason why 1 should have done so." i he* admiral said that the Hawk ar rived about 8 o'clock on the morning of May 13. This vessel, he said, hail brought the dispatch from,Adm, Sampson, whieh is designated as No. 8. This Is th* dis patch In which the commander-in-chief notified the commander of the flying squadron that the Spanish fleet probably was at Santiago, and directed him. "If satisfbd that they are not at Ctenfuegoa t*» proceed with all dispatch to Santiago.” The witness said he had received dupli cate copies of dispatch No. 8, and said he identified the copy brought by the Hawk as the first received by marginal notes which had been made on the citpy The admiral referred to a memorandum from the Dolphin published In Ihe appen dix to the report of the chief of the bu reau of navigation as follows: "The Hawk has just reported from Ci enfuegos with dispatches from Schley. 11oo*| says a good number of the officers don't believe the Spaniards are there at all, although they can only surmise." "That." remarked the admlrai, "would go to Indicate that Mr. Hood was not very certain In his own mind, or ‘f he had brought any verbal instructions to me, that he failed to report the fart to the commander-in-chief. Mr. Hood got Into the anchorage I think s*»m** time about 8 o'clock. The Adula did not get Into the anchorage at f'ienfueg.,* before I or 11 o'clock. Mem. Hood did not ! board that ship In my presence. She had ; already been boarded. If he boarded the i Adula and got this news and failed to deliver It to me. then he committed an Indiscretion, for I was the senior officer and he *11*1 not know what I was going to do with her, and I should have been very glad to have had his Information.” Adm. Schley said that on the night *.f the 2-M he had seen three horizontal lights to th*- eastward and to the westward of the harbor of Clenfuego*. "The one to the eastward," he said, "was In the moun tains and I should say t*n miles from the coast and certainly Mi feet up The oth ers to th*- westward wer* about five nr six miles in on the beach but back of It on the highland." lie said that w-hlle the squadron lay off (ienftjegog the winds wer*- fr<--h and th -re was quite a rolling awe'1 to th f . In this connection Adm. H* hl* y referred i to the fact that he had not le-en Inform* d lhaf there was any system of signals for * communicating with the Insurg nts and be raid that he *11*1 not know that there wore any Insurgents to th*' westward of tienfuegos. Continuing *>n the subj< * t of coaling Adm. Slchley adds: "After we got hold of colliers wo wer* I very much better fitted to resist sho* k as well as to deliver this eoal rapidly Perhaps, with th*- Inter experience of tin war. I might bar. coaled on dav v. 1 • h worse weather. We had a good many accidents about which no mention has been made because they cam*- after th« period <>f time. One of the roll!-re had to go to New York absolutely smash* *1 ; In. Adm. Schley testified that he heart) for J the first time the rode of signals ar ranged for communicating with tin- Cu bans on the morning of May 24. He sent Capt. MrCallfi ashore on the 2»th II* <ame bark and reported that he thought t the enemy was not at Clcnfuegos An hour or two had then, the witness said, been consumed In the preparation of dis patches Including a dispatch to be sent to the secretary of the navy, and about 8 o'clock the *<|tiadrnn steamed to the south. "I think," he said, "that we fi nally got under way between 7 and 8 o'clock on a course of about southeast." St leaking of the weather conditions on the night of the 21th. after the squadron had got under way, the admiral said that he remembered that the night was a ; dark one and the sky lowering It was ralnv squalls, he said Schley spoke of the weather on *he 2f»th as rough for the smaller ships j t’ormng to the 2*th. Adt i. S< hley said that the weather was still rough, and he | related the incident of ei ling Comman der Southerland away » h the Kagls. "He did not.’ the admtrai said, "Insist | upon eon ling his ship because It would j have been absurd. Impossible." "We continued pn Van easterly eourse, I as my orders contem'dated, approaching I cautiously, ana %t :k>y ziso conveyed to me the )rformation that probably that ^ksn / <cft t' enf ieg, 4 the enemy would • leave Santiago, I laid such a course as I ; thought would give me horizon and If he did leave I could not Imagine he would try to pees Inside of me. I es timated. of course, he would pass to the southward. My coufw as projected would have of course gone to China If there had been no Islands In the way.** The admiral then told how upon reach ing a point southward from Santiago about « or 5 o'clock In the afternoon of May '->* he had encountered the scout boats. At this point the admiral entered upon another defense of his course by saying: **I was on the south side of Cuba, of course. Invested. I thought, with entire responsibility. I was not In communica tion by telegraph. 1 did not know that we had secret agents In Havana. I did not know that there were any means of communication with the Insurgents. If that were known I would have known also, because I was acting In an entirely Independent capacity. 1 may almost say. 1 could not Ik* reached by telegrams, and a good deal I did had to bo left to guess ing. Some times I guessed right and I some times 1 guessed wrong, and I sup pose. In the light of recent events, we are liable to do that.** The admiral then referred to the Inci dent of Capt. Sigaby coming uboard the Brooklyn from the scoutboat St. l*aul He said: **I do not believe that he Is capable of stating what Is not true. In this In stance his recollection is at fault and not his veracity. 1 said to him: ‘Captain, have you got the dons here?* He said to i me: 'No. they are not In here. 1 have i been In very close.* I do not know but what he -aid ‘sketching.’ but he certain ly said. ‘They are not here, they are only reported here.' I said to him. 'Have any of the other vessels seen them, the Yale or the Minneapolis?’ He said. ‘No, they have not. They have assured me so.' ’* Adm. Schley explained his retrograde movement, so-called, to the westward, saying that he hud not considered the economical aspect of this step, as Un economical features could never he ta ken Into consideration In military move ment* He had. he said, made careful Inquiry as to the coal supply of the vari ous ships and had turned over In his mind the question of their endurance In battle "I was," he said, "thlnlii—a over in my mind that a squacUo*?! in its coal ing endurance, or at least in Its speeding endurance was equal only to Its weakest member. Just as the speed of a fleet de pends upon its slowest vessel; that It would be necessary to equalize as nearly ns we could th** standards of steam In order to Is* of effective use ns a unit, and that determined the westward move* mint." Adm. Schley again referred to the un nuinng.nl>,, condition of the collier Mer 1 rlniac. saying that no prudent comman der would have sent a ship alongside of m r. "It was a risk that would have been too great and a danger that would have been too imminent," he said. "1 felt that my Judgment was better than that of any one else, because 1 was on the spot looking at the scene and charged with that responsibility which makes one usually conservative. Therefore I did ■ not do it, and I coaled at the earliest mo ment when it was practicable." Referring to the arrival of the Harvard, tlie witness spoke of the discrepancy In 'the report of the information which Uap tain. now Rear Admiral, Cotton, of that vessel, had brought aboard the Brook lyn. He said that the dispatch that Capt. Cotton had brought aboard had said that tile department's advices Indicated that tlie Spanish fleet was at Santiago. "Capt Cotton said he delivered a dis patch to me from Adtn. Sampson stat ! Ing that they were there. That dispatch ! never Touched me. 1 never saw it. I i never heard of it until the other day. Discussing again his dispatch to the de partment concerning the department's or ders. the admiral said: "If my reply to tlie telegram of the secretary of the navy is not on record. 1 would like to put It 1 he re In the terms I sent it, because I wrote it In English, gave It to Capt. Cot ton. asked him to turn it Into cipher und confirmed it afterwards in a letter to the department, which was received. The dispatch Is here and 1ms been in the de partment for nearly three years. f do not believe for one moment that in the translation of It there was any Intention to mutilate it. but I think In the choice of words which were not exactly of the same meaning the dispatch did not get to the department entirely as I intended it should. Upon this dispatch is based the charge of disobedience of orders. I contend that there was no disobedience of orders There would have been diso bedience of orders if I had abandoned my station, but having returned to the station without other dlreetlon and hav ing found that the department's Informa tion was correct, 1 hold that I did not disobey orders and I think that dispatch, read and interpreted as sent will relieve that charge.” Washington. Oct. 2fi—When the Schley court of inquiry adjourned Friday Adtn. Schley had not completed his testimony in chief. He took the stand about 11:30 o'clock, after former witnesses had been recalled for the purpose of making cor rections in and additions to their testi mony. and continued Ids statement until the court adjourned at 3:40 p. m. until Monday. This adjournment. 30 minutes In advance of the usual time, was due to the fact that the admiral's throat has become somewhat sensitive as a re sult of his continuous talking Thursduy and Friday Aflm, Schley began his description of the battle of July 3 at 2:30 o’clock. "On the morning of July 3 the day broke beautifully. The skies were fleeced with white clouds and the breeze continued a little bit longer off the land that morn ing than usual. After 1 had eaten break fast I came up to take a survey of the situation with glasses. We were lying at that time possibly three miles or a little hit over from the land, and I wondered very much why they had per mitted us to remain so close.' it was a matter of constant Inquiry and discus sion on board, and especially why the bat teries did not tire on us. At a quarter ot 9 my orderly reported to me that sig nal had been made from the flagship to disregard her movements and that she had gone eastward. I did not, of course, know she had gone. "I came on deck with my glasses, after having gone below for a little while, and whilst I was sitting abaft on a hatchway, I heard a rail frorn the forward brldg.. 1 ‘tell the commodore that the ile.-t is com | Ing out ’ That was some time after the men had been *; lied to quarters, about ** 25 o'clock. The ship at that moment i w.*s lying with her bead In toward the land In the direction of Cabanas, which was a little cove to the westward, and one of the marking points we used In I maintaining our positions f looked over , the starboard side and saw the enemy e-.mlng out of the entrance of the har bor | them looked eastward to see the order of the ships, and I saw the Texas apparently a point or rnor* abaft the I starboard beam My own rpcolloc'lon now, as mar a - I ran state It. Is that th<> ■ hip's head was near nor-norwost The Texas appeared to me to be heading on some of the easterly courses. To the left of her was th* low a Bhe whs, of course to th*- eastward of the Texas. Th- Or c m was to the »h« eastward of the Iowa 1 The Indiana was eastward of tha» po sition, >nd the Gloucester was lying In under the land, I thought. In the neigh borhood of Aguidores The N*w York v/as out of sight of signal distance with glasses. I looker) at that In order to , determine what my position In the ae tion was to Ik If th- vessel had no been out of “Ight. I *hotild not hav*- made a signal. Th*- moment I saw' that, I went forward onto a little platform. I had constructed upon the battle tower as my position In th- battle In order to be verv ejn-w to «'•**.t Cook. I had only been there a mom* nt or two «h.-u f’apt. t'ook bdnod me. fn the meantime Mr. ffodsnn, who va« on the upper I bridge, sang out something *o the cap tain about bdnjr connected up and all ready, and he it the same time said to me, 'f’ommodore. they are coming right at ns.' " 'Well,' I said, ‘go right for them ' The helm was put nport. The ship was started ahead, first at perhap« half spe«d. T do not recollect. Rh»- took her wav very quickly, and when we headed around. | said to Capt. fook, 'Go ahead, full speed, and hoisted signal to -Icar ship for teflon. We generally made ehaf sig nal because there wns around the quart -r deck and the forecastle of most of these ships a little temporary railing composed ittttalh’ of oars and rope to keep people from failin'? overboard. Generally an awning of Some sort was up. Thar signal was followed bv 'Close up for close ac tion ‘ Th« flrooklvn. as well as the other vc«“«1s of the squadron, charged Imme dla’*ly Into *he entrance In accordance with *he original plan of seeking the enemy's “hips In the entrance or driving them ushor We continued directly for the head nt the enemy's column, the idea uppermost In my min.I being that If w*j meld arrest them long enough for the battleships to close in and knock them to pieces that would be our best point to att «ck They continued on this course, porting and starboarding to meet the movement of the leading ship, which 1 assumed to he the flagship with 11 (tag on her masthead. 1 suppose from the time we started we Wfre ten to LI minutes turning, first with port helm and then ad vanctng direct to the enemy. 1 saw the ships to the eastward and west ward. closing In. I said to Capt. Cook. ’Close action or close up naa bee*i hoisted, mid It means to k<v|i Inside of a thousand yards, out of *hetr effective torpedo range.’ Capt. Cook was standing alongside me and said. 'Yes. we wjll soon be within the crossfire of these shins ' I said. *Yas.‘ and 1 then saw we had advanecd without firing. The first gun I think was fired by Ideut. Simpson almost directly over the forecastle of the ship I saw the leading shin, which ap parently had started with the Intention of ramming, take a turn ahead to the westward, leaving a gap between her and the ship following, which subsequently proved to be the Vtscaya. We were ad vancing In the direction of the Vlscaya. when she also seemed to have given up the Intention to ram and turned to the westward, following the direction of the leading ship. It then became apparent, as we were steering on diametrically op posite courses, that the original plan had failed, and that the Spanish fleet. In order, and apparently at distance, hud suece«*ded In passing the battleship line. 'A new feature of the fight became Im mediately apparent. CujU Cook gave the order to port helm. I did not. I should have done It In a second. 1 saw the ship's hend swinging very rapidly, and I asked h!n» whether his helm was hard a port, and he replied that It was. either upon or hard aport. 1 think he said hard a port. 1 never saw the ship turn more rapidly than “he did ut this time. Her turn was absolutely continuous. There was no easing of her helm T never saw the starboard side of the Texas at all. Wo were never across her hows. I never was at her port side, and she never ap proached any position that was within t**' yards of the Hrooklyn. 8ho never entered Into my head at all as a menace or danger. Wh passed completely uround the circle. The lease range that was given was 1.1ft* yards, and the fact of tho nearness of that ship (the second Span ish ship) Impressed Itself upon my mind and will never be forgotten, because 1 could see with the naked eye men run ning over tho turrets to her superstructure dock, and I observed the daylight between their legs as they ran. We turned very rapidly, and 1 had been for a long time under the Impression that our startamrd engine was hacked, from the fact that i was standing upon the starboard, nnd in looking astern I saw an unusual amount of churned water. It looked to me very much as If that engine hud been backing. Though the mutter was not <mu> of record, as I found out subsequent ly. I had always been under the Impres sion that that engine had backed. I Mir ing the turn Mr. Hodgson very properly made some allusion to the lookout, per haps for the Texas. 1 do not recall what It was. hut there was never any col loquy of any character between Mr. Hodgson and myself, l-'trst. lie was too good an officer to have transgressed one of the plainest duties of an officer at such a time, and, second. If he had un dertaken it I would not have permitted It for a second. That Is fiction; there was no colloquy. •‘Before wo turned, the leading ship was abeam or a little abaft the beam, and when we turned about she was ahead of us. that Is. on the starboard bow, and all four ships and the forts were firing at the same time, and from that moment the following 10 or 15 minutes were th" most furious part of this entire combat. I remember very distinctly seeing, from time to time, as my attention was at tracted for a moment, the Jots of water ahead and astern and over and short. The roar of the projectiles was one of the things that cun be hoard only once In a life time and then never forgotten. It appeared at that moment that all four of those ships were at work upon the Brooklyn, and up to the moment of turning, so far ns we could perceive, there was not the slightest evidence that they had ever !>ccn Injured. The thought passed through my mind that after all our precaution and wnlting those fellows would get away. At that moment I felt and I thought J remarked to (’apt. Cook that we were alone and would pcrhnps have most of the tight upon ourselves, because I did not know then that the battleships could possibly keep up their speed. But I said to him wc must stay with this crowd. I had no idea that w*• would escape. Of course. If they could have shot as well as our people did. they certainly would have got us. “When we had completely turned around on a westerly course the ships appeared to have been broken up a little, although still In some semblance of formation, and Just at that moment I saw the Oregon breaking through this cloud. She broke through on to the star board quarter of the flagship. I had hoisted the signal of ‘clone lip' and then 'Follow the flag.' feeling that a new «Vh posltlon was necessary. That signal was replied to, and I saw It repealed. Cupt. Clarke knew very well It was not In tended for him, because he wus following the flag, so he repeated It to the other ships. In a very few moments after the Oregon broke through this cloud of smoko she was perhaps four or five hundred yards dlstnnt. Thene two ships, the Brooklyn and the Oregon, were tiring In a manner I had never Keen before. I never before realised what rapid-gun tire meant. Both ships were at that time a sheet of flame. Boon after that I saw that the leading ship was evidently bat tered hard She lagged astern. I saw smoke coming out of her ports and out of her hatches, and the fact that Im pressed Itself upon me was that the col umns were going straight up In the air. I said to Capt. Cook, who was constant ly at my side anil always In my confi dence, 'W'e havn got on*. Keep the hoys below Informed of nil th** movements. 'They can not see and they ought to know,* and h«* did so throughout the ac tion. Every few moments messages were s**nt below to fho men that were answered oftentimes with cheers, which we could hear through the ventilator "It appeared to be a very short Interval of time after that that I saw a second ship on tire, which proved to be the Oquendo. Hho evidently had suffered severely, and started Immediately In shore, leaving the Vlseaya and th** onion. The Vlseaya Immediately took a ' . .i*ttn«r position *»n »h*> bow. and I thought for a lit 11** while that she would out roof us. Th** Colon worked Inshore, and th** tlnu* b«*tween th* dropping out of action of t ho * two ships until the Vlseaya turned In* bore was a period of perhaps 30 min utes. during which she was abreast of the Brooklyn and th*> Oregon. I looked to the eastward and got occasional glimpses **f the Indiana and th** Oloucestcr. I could not see very well what th* y w**r.* doing, owing to th** clouds of amok*, i though I knew that both w< r*> doing admirable work. I felt *ha? the moment tho > vessels ran Into *hc leach ih** com manding officer* of the ship* which could n< t keep Up the pace with th«* two lead ers would take cnr«* of th** prisoners and save th«*m from the Insurgent* as w**l| ns from their own fire. About 3<> minute*, ns m*ar as I can r«*memt>'*r. was the length of time from th<* turning In or the wounding of those two first ve**ej* until the Vlseaya wen* ashore. Hh»* was i little forward of th** tv am *>f th* Brook lyn. and f do not think u» nnv time over 2.300 or 2.bit* yards away, Ah<* was Iri mis' excellent target range, and I r** memlM-r that a marine stationer! in tin top reported that he did not see any >f th«- -'hots *>f th*' two ships, th** Brook lyn and the Oregon, hitting the water. Bo I Imagin'd from that they were striking the shift. "It was on the trip outward, after the turn. I w.i« very anxious about the rang***, because I did not want the VI* eava and the Colon to got out of go»*l fighting rang.* Bills, who was an ex pert with the sf.arllmetcr, constantly k**pt that Instrument on these vessel*., and knowing exactly their heights, reported to me that fb*y were maintaining the same range, bu* I thought m\ eye was a little more sensitive, and I said. No. they are evidently gaining ' If* went from m«* the second time and that was the Inst I «aw of him anv<s. In performing this magnificent duty he lost his life He was struck about f< n feet from where I whs standing. IBs brain* and Mood wore thrown over a great many people and »om< of ft reached me. I "Blent. McCauley and I*r I>'v alln got down, nr rather they were Mnndlrg. between me nnd the tower They idcked up the body and carried it o the side. I Ju*t happened to see fh«*m through this opening, and calling out to ( them not to throw that body overboard; that I thought one who had fallen *n gal lantly deserved to he burled a* a Chris tian. "Just before th# Vlseaya turned to run ashore she put her helm nstarboard. ap parently starting out for the Brooklyn or the Oregon. T do not rem-mber which, and evidently at that moment got a very severe wound, for 1 saw quite ar. cxplo ftton under her bow. and In a moment afterward she pul helm hard sport. turn ins Inshore, smoko coming from nil of ner hatches. "I thought she was going to capslxe. she had such s tremendous list to port Just then. I saw a shell strike her that appeared to me to rake her fore and att. and 1 thought to myself she would sink In deep water, r . I told the signal ottloer to signal to the Texas to look out for her men. and to save them, but the Texas was too far astern to receive the mes sage. 1 made the remark at the time, however. 'Philip Is alwavs sensible; he needs no Instructions about such things ' During this part of the tight I noticed that all of the signal halyards of my ship wero cut. I think possibly, with one exception. One of the speed cone* we had hoisted was cut and came very near striking me. After the Vtscaya had turn ed In with eolor down, the Colon edged Inshore and appeared to be following the contour of the coast, and I thought at the time, looking astern and observing what had happened to her consorts, that she whs staking the best place she sould find In order to end the matter at once. 1 said to Capt. Cook, ‘Cease firing,* and to make the signal I also told Capt. Cook to let his men come out of the tur rets Into the cooler air and get something to eat and to hurry up his men below. “I sang out to the men below that we had got nil of them except one, and that T thought they could W depended upon to eaten that other vessel. I heard a good deal of merriment and rejoicing I went back to the bridge and soon real ised that they were doing their best. There was a Jingle to the rails and a vi bration to the vessel, but I perceived that the motions of the ships were sluggish. I augmented to Capt. Cook that we j*os ; Rlbly had some compartments lilted. He sent the carpenter down, and It developed that one of the after compartments had filled with water, which we thought was due to the fact that we had received some injury below the water line. The carpenter, as well as the captain, thought It unwise to examine the compartment until we could get Into smoother water, where we could possibly handle It much more readily. That course was decided upon. The ship's speed, of course, « ante up with some rapidity, and toward 1J o'clock It was apparent that wo were gaining upon the chase. I said to Capt. Cook several times during the action, '\\ ould it not be a good Idea to edge In so that we could tlnlsh those fellows quicker?’ nnd he replied that we had them In the most excellent tnrget rang*, I and that the guns of the two ships seem ed to he doing most admirable work. Wo j were pointing at that time for Tarqulno j Point, under Cape <*rux. at the point i extending to the southward. Mv Idea was that In steering that course. If' the Colon I kept up her course she would bo obliged to come out. i men said I would get up a lot of extra ammunition so that when she enruo out Into close quarters It would be a question of but a few minutes before wo knocked her out. As >ve w<re going out to head her off there were various signals between the Oregon and myself, of a pleasing character. Some worn official. I gave the order to Capt. Clarke to open lire with his 13-Inch guns. Capt. Clarke has testified that he «11 not receive it, and 1 always had boon under the Impres sion until I heard him say otherwise that the order had been transmitted. However, we continued to advance, the Oregon and the Ilrooklyn. 1 don't think the Oregon was further astern than MOO yards. I do not believe the prolongation **! her course at any time could have pasned within 500 yards or the Itrooklyn. W <• were prnctienitv and relatively at th<> same distance; perhaps the Hrooklvn was a little nearer at times, and then the Ore gon a little nearet. We continued In this position until about 12:40. when we real ized that we with hi range of this vessel, and we trled tin* l.'l-inch and S-tuch guns on her. Severn I of them fell short, nut I remember that one of the Oregon's 13 • nch halls passed entirely over the Colon and that one of the 8-lnrh of the Itrook l>n passed over her also. I saw with mv own eves the Jut of water beyond. I thought at llrst It had gone through her. but It appears that It did not strike her. "" he position of the Colon being di rectly under the fire of ihe two ships, there was no question In the mind of the captain of the Colon that It would be fatal. I think that he did exac'ly right. A sacrifice of life would have been uti neccessary. so he fired the gun to lee ward and hauled his flag downward and ran Into the liar nt tin- mouth of Rio Tarqulno. I signaled at once to cease firing, that the enemy had surrendered. We hauled up nnd immediately passed Into position. We had some difficulty In getting out a boat, the stenm being • dr and the cranes having been struck. Thcv w’ore more or less Jammed. We steamed into a position of 1,000 yards. I remember distinctly Capt. Cook ask ing If wo should slow up. I said, ‘No continue In.' (apt. Cook changed hlii course. We were all In fighting rig We arrived In the vlelnity of the Col m, certainly at J :20. At the time she haul 'd her colors down I did not think she was over four miles from us. We were running then In the neighborhood of 15 knots. When this surrender took place f naturally felt Interested In the vessels fhit were following. I was then on the bridge, and with glasses I saw three ves sels astern. I could see the masts of two. I could onlv see the smoke of the thl*d one. We lowered the boat and Cap! Cook went aboard, lfe said to me, ‘Com modore, what are the terms of surren der?’ “1 said to him. Tncondltlonal. Those are matters that the commander-ln-r hlef must arrange. We can only receive an uncr.ndlt 1'iri.i| surrender.’ ‘‘At 2:2o o’clock the New York (Com modore Hampson’s flag ship) came up 1 had made signals to her. I think she was quite half tin hour In answering one of them. When she came up I made the signal to her that It was a glorious clay for our country and as soon as I could I went on hoard to pay my respects In flu- meantime Capt. Cook, who had been detained some little time, started off to muk*' his report and wen* on board the ! flagship. When ho returned, I took the j boat and went on board rnvself. There I I reported substantially what had >r I curred, the incidents nr.*l events nf th» I battle. In a hurtled wav. ’’Chaplain Royre, of the New York, j * am*- up atid said. ’Commodore, your work is pot over vet. The Resolute has Just arrived. Capt Katon report* that • here Is a Spanish battleship on the coast, and the admiral wants to see you.' i *venr over mm there round rapt. Clarke j In the presence of ihe commundcr-ln i chief. I in ide some suggestion to him nbf.ut hoisting the flag on the Colon, and I said I was prepared. If he had not coini up, to have sent a force of BO of BO men on I oard to take possession, to avoid ; anything like mv Impression Is that ,1 used the words 'monkeying with her * I sold that bemuse they were throwing something overboard. which after proved proved to be breech blocks I •id I thought that there must I be some possibility of Injuring her j piping below, Wounding her and mi on. ■ ‘Ah soon as he mentioned to me to fake tb< Oregon an I go eastward and meet : thll! ship, which had been seen by th. ( Resolute. I must say 1 felt some little d dlghl because I thought that after t|e • admirable work of il,«. •>uu.idron on lh.it i day and Ihe part that the Krooklyn arid o- gf.n had In It there was nothing that carried Hpnnlsh colors that we should | li iv< he»lt»f/’d to m« ef ''Tin admiral told of the pursuit of the J ft range vessel, h< w he had nut the n land h< i n Informed It war the battleship Relay', and how when It was ultimately | rim down. It proved to Iw th.* Austrian cnilser Marla Teresa, which was bound for M.inttigo to carry ewav neutral suh I Jects If the city wa« attacked by th*' American for< -*s Returning from |M« chase Adm Bob ley fold of passing th** l"wa. when he wns hailed hv Cip» Kvnus. 1 who Informed him that Adm. Cervera was on hoard and would like eery much to see him. Adm. Behley said that he j then went on ooard the fowa. having ! In fhe meantime, directed his men not to j cheer, as he did not think It would l»e i proner to exult over a foe who had fought j a.of behaved no gallantly. “I found th# Bpanlrh admiral greatlv dejected. I said to him I knew he had lost everything, clothing as well ns j money, and Informed him that my ward robe wen a# my nurse, -»x far ns that i would go. was at his service. “Adm. Cervera, (he witness said, thank ed him for his courtesy, saving he ha*! i never met a sailor who was not a gen : tleman. but declined the proffer, only n<k ! In* 'o he allowed to «end a dispatch to , his government announcing the fate of j hl>* apuadron. I told him there would 1 t>e no objection fo that whatever. “ ‘And that,' the admiral said, closing hls narrative impressively -ended tha i rmttlc of the .VI day of July, irg ' I wish to add. he continued, that I | was very much Impressed or, that day I with the fact that the officers and th* { men who were enrs'd In *hat s-urgl., , fulfilled in the vify higher- ,,n'‘ ;r tb* | very nobP #t degrao the traJitlo- , ' f tha I AJUeilcgu HiAVV.’-f LIFE IS SACRIFICED .Nineteen Persons Dead as the Re sult of a Fire in Philadelphia. Police anil rirrmrii Are Delving I r - to the HmIum nail It la Kearrd That Other. Hava l.ont Their Llvea. Philadelphia, Oct. 28. — Nineteen known dead nml property loss amount ing to upward of $500,000 ia the awful renutt of n tire which occurred Fri day in the business aection of the city. The number of injured ia not known definitely, but fully a score of victims were treated at various hospitals. Police and firemen were Friday night delving into the ruins in search of bodies sup|H>scd to have been buried beneath the debris, as it is feared that others besides the known dead may have lost their lives in the tinmen. The buildings destroy ed were the eight story structure. 1210 and 1221 Market street, tvccupied by Hunt, \\ ilkinson A Co., upholsterers and furniture dealers, and three three story buildings occupied by small merchant men. The big furniture building extended buck a half block to Commerce street, and was owned by Henry I*. I,on. I lie blaze broke forth in the build ing occupied by Hunt, Wilkinson & Co. and one hour later the horrible sacrifice of life bad been made and the immense loss of property had been accomplished. The origin of the death dealing conflagration is un known. It is saiil that an explosion of naphtha or gasoline in the base ment was tlie cause, hut this is de nied by Mr. Wilkinson, who snys there never was a su flic lent quantity of either explosive n bout the building to lie responsible for the terrible disas ter. Humor lias it also that on eleva tor constructor at work in the base ment permitted the flames of his lan tern to communicate with some of the gaseous liquids stored in tin* base ment and that this was the cause of flic conflagration. Sueh a disastrous Arc attended with so great u loss of life in such a brief period was never before known in this city. Men and women died a lin gering, agonizing death iu the pres ence of thousands of spectators who were unable to lift a hand to their assistance. The rear of Hunt, Wilkin son &. ( o.’s building faces on Com merce street, a small thoroughfare. On the fire escapes at this building two men and one woman were fairly roasted to death while tin* horror stricken throng on the street below turned sick at the sight. In the front on Market street a woman, driven to desperation, leaped from a window on the top floor mid wns dashed to dentil on the pavement. These are but a few of the heart-rending scenes attending the conflagration. Fire men claim to have seen men ami wom en, unable to reach the windows or fire escapes, burned to death in the interior of the building. If this is so, little or nothing remains of these vic tims, and it is doubtful if any por tion of their bodies will be recov ered. Shortly before midnight nnother body which wns very badly burned was taken from the ruins. This makes the number known dead 19. FIVE WERE KILLED. Terrific Kxplosloa In a l'rnn«rlvanl«i Mine—Benlilna the (lend \lnr |*rr *«»*»• Were Injured. Wilkeslnirrc, I’a., Oct. 20.—A ter rific explosion of gas occurred iri the Muttonwood mine of the Parrish Coal f o.. situated one mile south of this city, which canned the death of five men and the Injury of nine others Directly after the explosion occur red a number of rescuers, at the rink of tlislr liven, entered the mine filled with dangerous after damp and brought out the bodies of the dead and Injured. Ho far ns can be learned the explo sion was caused by the rnrrl<*M*ncnn of one of the Hungarian laborers, who was injured. He opened his safe ty lamp while at work, in his cham ber. Thin caused a small body of gns to explode, which, however, did not injure the men or cause any damage. I he explosion wan heard, however, hy the foreman and hin assistants, who rushed into the chamber only to en counter another larger body of gas which had accumulated from the first explosion. The second explosion was of such force that it hurled the men in all directions. I he iKiilirs of the dead were badly mangled. Kx-f’rrnlUcnt Cleveland Invited. Lincoln, Neb., Oct. 20. \t a meeting of flu- senior elasn of the University of Nebraska, to whom is given the right to choose its orator, it was de eidrd to extend an Invitation to for mer President (Hover ( leveland to de liver the commencement day address next dune. Shot Thransh the Head. New York. Oct. 2ft. - Daniel Dodge, an 11-year-old l»oy, who was shot, in the head by his companion, Willie Weston, while they were playing ‘■William Tell ami the Apple," at Far Iloekowa^, died at St. John’s hospital from hin injuries. Heavy I'nllnrr, Ncvv York. Oct. 2ft.—Thomas I*. .Tones. William (’. Palmer and Tbon. J. lifitemnn. wholesale denier* is gro ceries and oofTcc, assigned Friday. | The fit in was rated at from to $2W,U00.