The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume], June 16, 1917, Image 13

About The Wheeling intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1903-1961

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Battles
Metaurus
IIEBFUL HUGH OF CONSUL
?, NERO BROKE (MIE POWER;
. IDE 1011 EMPIRE POSSIBLE,
Then* were two NYros. When vr
Lear the name w*> think only of the!
infamous tyrant who is sai.i to haw:
fiddled while Rome burned. Hut had
ir not been for the other. earlier and j
greater Nero, the Consul whose bril-j
liant and almost tinequaled march i
made possible the winning of the bat
tle of the Meta'urus. the second Nero i
would never have tiddied or reigned
There would have been no Rome for
a Roman to burn, no Rome for a Ro
man to rule. Th" dark Carthaginians,
would have been master of Home:- in!
all probability master? of the civilized;
world. But Nero marched, the metau- '
rtis was won and Hannibal, gazing
?upon the bloody head of his hrother,
which had been thrown into his camp.
i knew by thai ghastly token end had
come to the world empire dreams of
Carthage.
The battle of Metaurus was fought '
between the Romans and the Car
thaginians m 2"? F?. C. The Roman
?M historian called the struggle "the most
memorable of ail wars that ever were,
carried on." Here was decided that
the. growing Roman republic should
continue in growth and that th? Punic
power, seeking in its absolutism to
crush out all free government, as seeks
the power of absolutism today, should
go down forever. The metaurus is a
small riv.er. On the day of the battie
it is said to have run red with blood.
For seventeen years Hannibal and
his Africans strove against Rome.
Hannibal quite eclipses Carthage. He
has been likened to a Homeric god. He
was a . conquering soldier of genius.
Only a little his inferior in military
skill was his brother, the rinnmed Has
drubal.
At the time of the Metauraus Han
? nibal. with a powerful army, had been
for no less than eight years in Italy
executing, with the utmost ferocity the
vow of ha* red to Rome to which as a
i^child he had !ie?>ti sworn bv his father.
Vthe great Hand lea r. His fore-- .seemed
? unconquerable. Arid now to assist hint
m in admin t.^Tt : in u the <*oup de grace ;<>
r Rome came Uasdrubai. who bad been
campaigning in Saain. and who. elud
ing the Roman turns, came over the
Alps. w.i.r elet?h;>ni> and all. -i> reveal
himself a; t ! i ? ? north of I.orubardj .
Rnnt". !?* r aoptsiataur d*-rin;at?*d by
the sav;tu?ry i>f Hannibal's attacks,
her fields laiu waste by his soldiery,
wasted and ??xbausted. was bleeding
at every por*. She could not drive
Hannibal back. And now there came
to him more power.
In the emergency Rome cast about
^icr for leau-r- t'aiiH Claudius Nero.
9a patrician, who had served both
against Hann'ba! !n Italy and Has
drttba! in Spain, was the first chotcs.
For the gerund 1 h^re was dispute The
selection finally fell to Marcus Livius.
a grim old man who was in discra<-?>.
but wj'.-s r?-:tu allu red as the last n.an
to celebrate a triumph in tiie streets
of Rome. rh-?r?* had b^eu no triumphs
.^inee Hannibal ( am** Livius rated and
despised Nero true was effect
ed. The f?o besjati their pn para*
tio'ts.
With Hasdrubal d> sccr.din* from
'the north, the casting of loss decided'
j that h? should bo opposed by Livius. !
, while Xe: o faced the creator Hannibal, j
! 1'rainiiij: the city of it.s last available!
man and. its last'ounce of supplies, the j
two consuls went forth. By hitter ex-t
perience Rome had now learned better
than to instruct her generates how to I
conduct their battle?. Old Q. Fabius j
did attempt a bit of advice to Nero,
that he should refrain from giving or I
accepting battle until he well under
stood the enemy's condition, but the!
consul gave him a froward answer. j
Hannibal marched to Canisium,
near where lay Nero with 40.000 in- 1
fantrv anil some 2. .">00 horse. Another j
Roman force, 20.000 strong, menaced ;
Hannibal at Tarentum. It was noj
easy matter for even Hannibal tot
march north, leavinsr this army to tam
per with his supplies and his allies in !
the rear. To out-manouver Nero and J
get into easier touch with his brother i
he marched into Lucania and out
again. Nero followed, but gave him
no chance for a decisive battle. There
was mere checkmating.
Meanwhile Hasdrubal was driving
before him the Roman force under
Porcius. Livius came bustling up to ?
assist this hard-pressed warrior, but'
still the dark host of Hasdrubal rolled!
triumphantly on. I tack beyond tliet
Metaurus fell the Romans, Jubilant. I
Hasdrubal sent messages tn his broth
er to unite their armies in llmhria and j
descend upon helpless Rome. Hut here j
fate intervened. The messengers were I
captured. It was not Hannibal, but j
Nero, who learned the Carthaginian i
| plan of campaign. The brothers were!
within 20t> miles of each other. Jfi
Rome was to be saved they must never J
| meet alive. Nero acted with brilliancy I
: and daring. Detaching T.Ouu of his j
? most desperate rumen to keep Hannl-J
bal in play, tie wheeled in his tracks
and set off to join Livius for an over .
whelming attack upon Hasdrubal.
: Night and day his men pressed on. j
They ate as they trudged. They broke j
the records of the niost famous Ro-j
man legions for marching. Rome, no- j
rifled by the consul's letter of his in
tentions. was In a par.ie at his audac- i
itv. How long it would it take Han-!
nibal to pursue anil overwhelm him 7'
Still Nero. stern tn his purpose, pushed j
forward. Hy ninht his fichting thou-j
sands cano "pouring into the camp of j
Livius -it Sena. Hasdrubal was but)
half a mile distant. A council <>f war i
in the morniiv declared tor delay that!
N-to's men might test. Rut Nero in- 1
listed on immediate battle. 1'p went
the famous red csign and into action j
went the men of Rome.
Hasdrubal. quick to perceive rei'i-l
forcements,. attempted to avoid en
casement. by placing the .Metaurus he*,
tween hint and his enemies. His guides ?
misled him. ilis Gallic auxiliaries got'
drunk. With an itnfordable part of the.
ri\er at his back lie was forced to risk1
encounter. .? j
Fearful was 'he spectacle of the f
; Carthaginian army. The Numidian
horsemen swa-med on th? Hanks. In:
the van were the Balearic slinsers. A
: line of colossal war elejihants made
!a chain of moving fortresses before;
NEW ARRIVALS AT THE FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON TRAINING CAMP;
OF THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS NEAR INDIANAPOLIS.
~~~ 1,1 ? - ?????I Imr ?? ' ' '
EjOB
OewCHflEWS OUf?LAii^,7%
Hundreds of such squads of young men from Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky and West Virginia consti-i
tute the Officers' Reserve Corps at present at Fort Benjamin Harrison, near Indianapolis. These mem
have just arrived and are on their way to have their baggage checked.
OFFICERS IN THE MAKING AT THE FORT BENJAMIN HARRISON CAMP OF;
THE OFFICERS' RESERVE CORPS NEAR INDIANAPOLIS.
NEWS BUREAU^
This is the first process in officer making- at the camp of the Officers' Reserve Corps. An experi
enced army officer is reading and explaining- the Manual of Anns. These classes consist of about seventy
five men each. There are now 5,200 men in the camp.
ill* whole army. Hest of all. Hasdru
bai's men were liis veteran Spanish
infantry. These. under his own com
mand. he took to lite right win*. The
The mahouts ??f his elephants were or
dered, iu event of any retreat by tle-ir
animals, to kill ilieni by driving
vpjkes into their vertebrae.
The. elephants broke the first shoek
of the- Roman advance and broke it
badly. They trampled over the le
gions. L'ay in their brazen helmets by
red feathers. NVrn. commanding the
righi wing. had difficulty in breasting
a hill. This left llasdrnhal's riijhr ap
parently safe. Seeing this he pi usi i: ? -i!
1 1 ho other divisions into i li?^ thh-k "i
i * h?* ti.nlit. Tin' Human ensigns wotv
; borne backward.
Th.-ii X ?'?!( i nncovorcd anolh'T '!asl\
J Of u?Miius comparable with his mann.
Wln i'liny a of his best nn 11
| round thu roar of th" Knntan army. Is
jattacki'd the Carthaginians furiously
j in the Hank. Tc attack was as stie
i ressful as ii was sudden. The Span
, iards and Africaaus brok?*. The Hauls
; wore butchep'd as they stood. The
rfri.uh't'ned elephants. their mahouts
doad. wi?ut truniii'Minu over d-a<! and
! livinsr. llasdruhal. beholding all !<>>;,
i and .scorning to becotno a captive lor
JinniM) jirido and i-rurliv. sniirroel bi*
Iiht in I r? t h ? ? vt>ry niiil.-t ? >!' a i C< >m:t 11
cohort <i ltd oii'il ;>< belli! t'd <t poii of
I lamilcar.
!i was Xoro wiio onii'roil thai lla.s
drubalV lioacl be thrown inii> Him
ramp hi' lUnibal. h was dnnii by
: 1 i .u ! i i . '!*? ii years Ix-fure Hannibal bad
last bi-lirbl bis brother's fan'. Then
f In* v bail iilnintii iniii'ibi-p i lie e?>n
qui si hi' ! !? ? 'ii ? ? I'flii'ldiliR 1 h?? si i: bt
b'ss i-yi-s ih" sci*;1.! Can hatrinian
crnaiii il : 1 1 ? ? i ; 1 1 i!:a; ):?> beheld iiis o.nii;
fry's destiny.
(Xi'\t W'edmv ri.iy, A rm initis" Slaugh
ter uf the Koniuns i
THE
til
ursL
Its Employment to Defeat Germany's
U-Boats Depends on Imme
diate Needs.
BY HARSY O. CHASE
?'hlef Muslin i-r, the South vvark uFundry
ami .Mucliiuc Ci>mi>tuiy.
The cargo submarine, as our ulti
mate recourse against the continu
ous decimation of shipping by Ger
many's U-boats. may juomist; about
1 ,1 l.;'i,0"0 e.ms 01 carrying rapacity,
.sale and sure of uninterrupted opera
tion, .within a total period of 24
months, while our shipyards, as now
equipped, but with their working
force doubled, may be producing
their normal total of 1.50", 000 tons' of
steel surface shipping, all standard
ized, all armed, ail h<i\ing a speco ot
la knots or more, and all effective in
reducing appreciably the proportion
of surface destruction as compared
with that wrought by Herman subma
rines in the past. Hilt these deduc
tions are based upon our potential
in hulls alone, for ii is with the bulls
particularly that our shipyards bust be
preoccupied. The yards now lilted
for building submarines an\ with
the exception -.if th" Fore IJiver plant
anion:.' the large ones, small, special
ly equipped plants like the l.ak?* Tor
pi do IJoat and the Klertric lloat com
pany, and too ft w To 'count appre
ciably in the vast, campaign which
would have io be inaugurated.
The crux of i lie cargo suttmari'ne
situation apart froru the difficulties
of hull const ruction. Ms to ne round
in tin- building of the engine.*. Here
we enjoy an advantage denied us in
surface ship construction: for where,
in the surface ships we must builfl.
speed is ail 'important as a means of
escape from enemy submarines it is a
secondary consideration in undersea
CHriio boats which have only enemy
submarines to fear and can escape
! from them by submerging. Thus our
' submarine cargo boats could make
practically all of a voyage on 'h? sur
face and so utilize the full powers ot
; their engines, at the minimum expeti
; dilute of fuel.
J It is indisputable that we can build
iho Diesel engines that w; i 1 1 he needed
i for operating the cargo submarines.
As a maiter of fact, we -have been
building Diesel engines from German
designs. 1; is true that we have no
knowledge of rise perfection to which
I the Germans have (tarried their Diesel
engine construction since the be?in
;ning of the war. P>ut we were very
(nearly on a par with them when the
j war began. 1 s.hould say that now we
[are not far behind them in the efficien
cy of the Diesel engines built here, mv
reason being that we measure up well
with Germany in the building of other
i engines, and have not hesitated to
} compete with her ill the markets of
j the world.
j All such engines as the Diesel must
he light in weight' for any given horse
j jiower. For a cargo submarine up to
n.rinfi or 1 .000 tons, the engine would
have from ".'n to revolutions per
i minute, givins u t> to 1.000 horse pow
er per engine of two engines per boat,
| or 2.000 horse power for a cargo sub
marine of -1.000 tons having a speed ol
i 10 knots per hour on the surface, with
I
speed submerged correspondingly re-'
duced. .
The engines must be constructed of,
very high grade materials In order,
that it may withstand the stresses in
cident to its high speed of revolution,.,
aud also in order (o keep down the to
jfal weight of the vessel's power plant
! Provision 0/ engines for 4,000*ton
! submarines totaling 1,000,000 ton8 of
| c argo space would mean engines for
: 250 hulls equipped, or 500 Diesel en
igines. of 1.00U horse power each. That
! number of engines would require the*
j total productive capacity of from 8 to'
j 1!J eng:ne building plants averaging^
j ".00 moil employed and possessing the' ?
(ordinary equipment of modern tools',
'and efficient organizations. There are
;in this country to-day a score and ?
more of such engine b lilding plants. ?.
I It would need about three months
j for the necessary reorganization: but
| within 12 months thereafter, those
j plants could turn out the Diesel
i. engines for submarines totaling 1,000,-.
000 tons capacity. Pending the re
organization of the plants the engine
designs could be satisfactorily worked
up As the essential for the cargo
submarine is nol speed but material..
The material entering into the con
st ruction of the Diesel engine is dif
j ferent from that commonly used in.
! ordinary power apparatus, for the
1 heavy pressure and the high temper
ature of these engines calls for a very
high grade material. We have withii*
our own borders, however, material
both in quality and in quantity. Our
foundaries could deliver all we should
, be able to use at the expiration of
I three months following the three '
months of preparation for actual con
struction. , ;?
To sum up: The obstacles in the
way of recourse to the cargo sub
marine are very grave, yet. not insur
mountable. The expediency of taking
that recourse is to be determined on!$
, after full consideration of all the
j factors applying to the immediate
i need of high speed surface ships and.
I of the probabilities bearing upon the
f duration of the war.
| ^Copyright l?tT. hv the National Edit-'
orial News Service. Ins. ) *
! CABLE FLASHES '
i I. ON' PON*. June In. ? Shortage of labor
1 is preventing fuller use of the canals In
j this country to relieve the congestion of
, railway traffic. Hundreds of canal boats
| are tied up in various parts of the coun^
j try for want of wen to operate them. At
i present only about 2,400 miles of th?
total of 4."53 miles of canal system are
? in use in Knglnnd and "Wales. "When
j tho canal traffic was at its height in
! 10ii5 the traffic amounted to 37,500,00V
tons.
1 T'KKIXG. June 15. ? Chinese studenti
! who were in "Germany when diplomatic
j relations between China and Germany
! were severed.' still are held there. .VI
| thouirh definite advices are lackh:.T at
. to the conditions under which the I'hU
1 nese students are- detained, Germany,
(stoutly refuses to release the Chinese
' ; students and is apparently holding t'nera
' as hostages against the safety -of Gc&
I ! mans in < 'hiua.
TEUTONS' PUNS |
-FRUSTRATED UK I
TI REPUBLICS!
By WXirHED H. SCHOTF.
4 Secretary of ttio Coaunercial Museum ;j
Axitlior of "South America, Colonial |
aad Step'abUcaii.'."
Germany's strategy in. this hem
isphere lias centered about the Carib
bean. .Oil fields in operation or avail
able an essential to the activities of
the allied uav u-.~ and communication;
with the Pacific is dependent on the"
Panama Canal and other short trade!
routes across Central America and j
Southern Mexico.
With th>- intrigues tor a foothold in!
the West Indies frustrated by the out !
break of th?' w;?r. a base of operations j
somewhere in Central America be-!
came e--s? ntial t<? trie German plans. ?
Th??re were several openings that]
looked ptomisL-ng.
A German base in the Cult' of I'raba,
?on the Colombian c>oasf . would have
directly threatetu-d the canal, lis tab- j
lishment of such a base might have I
t benn followed by occupation of Hi"!
? islands of Saint Andrew and Old
' providence. belonging to Colombia'and ;
nearer the canal by hundreds ot miles,
than any other island ba.->\ The|n*.\t
? trade route not h ward presenting 'pos
sibilities to C.eruiany was the depres
sion across Nicaragua, which would
have been utilized had the Nicaragua
Canal been constructed. ending iti an
excellent, landlocked bay, the Gulf of
Fonseca. Tbree ^republics - Nicaragua, '
I Honduras and Salvador- have each a;
" section of the l-orseca Gulf coast line..
! Possession of that bay would have;
given Germany a formidable base for j
operations against any point on the1
west coast ot America. A third hope'
" for Germany lay in the .short route'
across Guatemala, control of which \
might be attained by domination of
the Gulf of Honduras either through j
possession of the I5ay Islands or by'
seizure' of the harbor, of Belize in Brit-;
i-sh Honduras. Finally, the re was the;
route acrou> the Isthmus of Tehuan-'
tepee, now occupied by a railway built;
by British capital and having excel- ?
lent terminals, one on the Pacific!
wast and the other on the Gulf of'
Mexico.
. Of these four possible bases of I
operations, the southern-most and
the northern-most those of ("fa ha |
and Tehuantep?-c depend on j alii- 1
ances, if they could be made, with!
Colombia and Mexico against ; the!
I'nlted States. There is abundant!
reason *.o believe that German m-j
trlgue. before the I'nited States eti- i
tered the war. was directed towards I
the framing of both of those alli
ances: but without definite result.
The entry of the Cnited States into
the conflict immediately forced a
showing of hands throughout Latin)
America.
Of the other two routes, that across
Nic&r^.ua was the less desirable be
cause 6'f the lack of a good port on the
'""arrlbean sldo; There remained, then,
that across Uautamala, domination of
CHIEF OFFICER AT THE FORT BENJAMIN MAR
RISON CAMP OF THE OFFICERS' RESERVE
CORPS NEAR INDIANAPOLIS, IND.
COLONEL E. F. GLENN.
It is undoubtedly his strict adherence to army discipline that has i
made Colonel Glenn so well liked among the men at the Fort Benja-j
min Harrison camp of the Officers' Reserve Corps.
which could he easily secured by seizure i
i'f ih?- territory bilons^inK to *??.? Amerl-j
can republic ? the i"n??v?i colony of Brit
ish Honduras. Here was ti sparsely i>of>- I
ulnte?| and presumably, weakly de tended j
portion of the ? \irr!bea r.i coast lin- wh loll j
miicht be used f??r threatening every j
trade route in the tropical waters of the,'
hemisphere. As a bas<- for asKresslons ;
on land. Hrlrish Honduras would havoj
been ei'ially Important, l-'rom Chetumal'
bay. north of Hdr/.*-. a small force tniKhtj
have scoured possession of Yucatan. A I
hidd on that important peninsula would,
have afforded aec-ss to all southern ?
Mexico, .lust V.Vst of British Honduras [
lies the Uepilblic ot Gautemala. Its'
eastern port. Puerto Harries, must havo >
been easy of capture by a force operat- i
inp from Bell*'.
Gauieniala in serving its relations!
with Germany and aligning itself with:
the Knlt-d States, was protect Ins; itself!
from a da user ii"t onlv apparent. hut;
; very strongly supoprt- d by the Gorman j
intrigues- in Guatemala itself.
The must productive part of Central)
I Am-rioa is the highland" on the Paclrtc |
side, where Ihere are vast coffee estates.,
mainly owned or financed by Germans;
| who. before the war. took the bulk of
' the crop. It is not surprising. there- 1
I fore, to find an Industriously stimulated
campaign In that region for spreading ;
of dislike and distrust for the I'nlted i
States. In the little republic of Tan!
Salvador, which adjoins Guatemala, i
these influences havo been very obvious, j
Co-operation of a possibly friendly elo
ment In Salvador would have carried I
wiili It control of Fonsera I my. thisi
roumling nut the Gorman path for split-!
tlnjr asumler i In- Ann-rlfiis.
(?au;<-tnala's action lias l>r??n all hut |
?Ivcisive In hlockinx the who!?* Oorimmj
tram.; ami any ctinsetjucm'fs tlut; uiij-tht >
haw attemle<l < ierman plots in "?'???it ii- I
??rn ami Central Atii-riea. l*i?T j
there romaiii'-il <'.'sla Kisa. \v it!i tts.-in-j
ter-oconnic rallroa'l. h-ss attr:i?" iw as a]
point of attack because- of th" hlirh ?
vatioti at which it cpv^n-'s tin- mniiti-j
tains but possessing, at ii? I'airilli* .< r-.
minus an excellent liurh"r in Sit
hay. Costa Riga's action, in thrnkin^1
N'lcoya hay open to the alii'-d iiiivm s, i
was iVistu ttica's contribution f ? ? the in
tejfrity of Central Ann-re i ami t < ? ! f j ?? j
oviti hrmv of tli>? Ot-rman. pl.*Mt*.
As matters now staml. not hine' t !? !?- j
many can t|o in ami iilnui . Vntril Am-,
erica ran he brought abotst ihrou^h in- j
triune with any unc of tie* s?*vfi*.il kov- ]
ernments. It tnust l"- iimb-rink- n. if at]
all. by invasion ami comriesi. This Is
practicnlly out <?f th" quest h?:i.
(Copyright. T.'IT. hy Thf N'atitinalj
KJItnrlal Service, Inc.)
Lawyer 'to witness at a bnoy.e trial! -!
I'l<1 von take foirrilzant.'f of tin* man who |
Miltl him the liquor?
Witness ? I took the same as the rest. I
? Aw^wan. i
Croilltor ? T shall fall upon you every
week until you pay Ihis hill!
Hardleiifh ? Then there seems to he '
every possibility of our acquaintance ]
ripening into friendship. ? I'uck. !
Discusses the Probable Entry!
of Brazil m the War on
Side of Allies.
BY CEAELES M. PEPPER,
K.irmerly Trad.- Advisor to tit.- l'liiied
Stales 1 'oparirii'-nt of Statu.
Mrny.il is i h? ? first of the South Amer
ican coumri-s 10 gi i into tin- war. This
dor-a not invaci actual warring witii
i- 1 ? ? i ':;.anv ?. as uie eiiiente allies arc
warring, anil as the I'-nite-i States is
warring, but ltrazil lias gone farther
than to make a mere academic asser
tion of neutral rights. Slit- has affirm
ed thi? policy of aligning herself with
tlii' United States in international af
fairs by revoking h ? ? r neutrality m tin.'
Herman- American war.
I trazilian statesmen originally deter
mined on this policy with reference
to thi' affairs of tin* new world. Now
tln-y have broadened it 10 include the
affairs of the rutin* world. Tin's is
elm-fly significant as regards Knrope,
though it is not wiihont significance
as concerns the far east.
It la/, i I followed the I ' nit e?| States in
breaking off diplomatic relations with
'Serniany. The government did that
as an executive act. just as it was done
in the 1'nited States by President Wil
son as an executive act. The Presi
dent of Pray.il. however. could no more
declare war than could the President
of the I'nited States.
A f i a breaking off of diplomatic
relat oas. further action was subject
to tie - ill of I?." lirazilian congress.
Then- was a strong popular feeling
in ta\or of an immediate declaration
of war and public meetings were held
at which this feeling was voiced.
The..- u as. however, a conservative
body ot public opinion which was iir
favor of awaiting developmenis before
actually committing the country to the
status of a belligerent.
Though no: much has been transmit
ted by cable on ibis point, .some of the
Prazilian officials questioned whether
by actually entering the war as a bel
ligerent Urazil would be as helpful 10
tin* Pniied Stales as l:y maintaining
h.-r position thai (.ernianv was an out
law nation without diplomatic rcpre
seiiiat ion.
Brazil has an army an. I a navv. and
?si'iu.* Brazilian^ would !ii>" t ? ? .??>? lie.'
I '.vv in Kiii'. >i? ;i (i waters, aii.l I !?? Brazil
ian soNii.-.s in : li?* trenches of J**r:iii.->-.
There is a \.r; st'roni: sent intent' fur
l-'rajn .. itireiiu'li 'ii! Brazil. 1 'ii ihe j ra>
li'al >i.| . Imivevr. 1 ?i>'- difficulties
Irnittiiu. .-out I r.nisperl Inc troops that
wiiiiM he cii!:.r?-|. iit IV. r I h" west. -mi hat
tle i'r..iii ha vc I" consider. <1. A lift as
'.i ih- na*. v. w ! ? i !?* it is efficient, il is
ii'." large. ti was < - v ?- ?i <iu>-s! l-moil
u I -. I ll. r t be l.llV.lellS uf the Pnii.-il
lat.s navy citirhi net l.e titer, ivil.
Th-iv w i < i be further stu'ie sl i..n lli.it if
Brazil I one a Ndlipcr. lit it wont.) !?<*
necessary i.. a; ply for a loan t<> I lie
I 'piled Sta'. s.
"I'll.- ! '.ra/.ili.in Congress dettl-t l. '-s had
II,. iiitr.Mieies in mind, and they
may . \ ? 1 1 hi'.. Ik-c.ii discussed putdicly,
although no news of such discussion has
In. a transmitted. At any rate, after sev
eral days' dis. Mission. the Congress soems
li. have rcacli.-d an it ridt.rstandin^ b?
hvwn ih<? group favoring immediate
i war and t he more conservative ^roup
| which, wliilo hostile to Oormnny, floes
nut want the country to engage formally
Still Time to Pianf !
Numerous Vegetans1
IT IS NOT TCO LATE TO PLANT f
Stria? Beans, Lima Beans, Tomato j
Plants (second planting'), Ejrtr- | j
plant, Pepper, Early Ca'bb.igre Plants, ; 1
Cucnmbois, Aluskmelons, Water- | I
: melons, Sweet Corn (2d or 3d plant- \
ing), Okra. Squash ? pie, Sweet PO- j
I tatoos. Beets (2d or 3d planting-). ' i
1 If yiiu have not already planter] a
garden, there i.? still iiim* even in this,
I iv >: iuii, (marked zone (.' un ill" l>e-j
partnu'iii's zone planting map lor veg- 1
dallies i in urnw some food. .say spt- j
cinlisis nl' llie I'. S.- Department of Ag- '
rivultuiv. No! a day should be lost, ;
'however, in 'planting. as tin1 must t'av- 1
orable plain nm period for most veg- j
cialil"s is past, aiid as the crops must;
b<- ^iv>-? an opportunity u? become!
?well established he'tore hoi weather;
sets in. Anions: I vegetables which]
j still may lie planted w i : 1 1 good ' bailees j
\ of success are siring In-ans. lima beans j
(both bush ami cucumbers.1
iimslciiielons, watermelons, o k ra.
i M|i>.asli sweet potatoes, early rabbaije, !
> sweet corn, beets. (?nd tomato, egg
! plain ami pepper plants.
i If yon haw already started a par- J
I den, bin have not plumed t he crops i
j named, von should lose no time in get
i t i 1 1 U tile Seed in.
There is. nf course, considerable |
i variation within the region for wludil
'this adviee is given. ' li may be thal|
| the possibiliiy for plant Injur success- j
i fully certain of the crops mentioned
! has passed in the more southerly sec- 1
j lion-'. The advice is based oil 'he lat
est for dates for the section, and the
I variations in weather cundiflons from!
year lo year also may influence plant
: inir periods. !
i The following cultural suggestions
? are made for the crnps .which may yet j
?be ]ilaiited with fair chances of sue- .
'cess i h rou. ah-. hi l this region:
I String beans ? Plant in rows of two;
| and one-half feel apart for either |
; horse or hand cultivation.' and " to 4 J
j In ihv war wiiheiii knowing just wlmt It
; > .<n ? !? ? l(,i further lie i'IUINi; < > t" the allies.
| I r.iiir I lie n ??(?????ineiil which seems to
j haw bc-n p-aeb' d by ? i "engross auih- |
; ori/.ed tie- t'r< >iileiii i<> announce Mrahil's
;r?vni-.(i i.>n 1. 1' it- ut ra Illy us l?-:w *ii th?
| I " in t ? ? 1 St;i;.s .out I Jel'liiniiy . with a \ i?-iv |
! of lav ??riinr th* t * ri it ?-< I Stai--. t : ? I ?m- I
I po\\-,-rei| III,! executive lit lOVoiie tliC Il"ll
!lf:i!ily of I : rax it as between !!"? ?-tH ?-i?t o
[ alih's ami th" ei-mral powers us soon as i
!h'- moment is deemed propitious. Tie? j
J ? ? i - 1 ? n i i i? : ?-ri l of litis action is I" pb j
I llrazil i:uer|ti i vocally before the world as
'?n ill-- siil.- nf ih" fulfil Siat"S. This
| is i he affirmation of h? r internal loiial j
I Wh"lli?M* liter 'I'-vi'lopm- nis will re
I Mill in ihe official di-elarati"ii "f a staii'j
"f war bi-twi ?.li (Jermany and Urazil ?'ini
i.ol now- h" for. -tolil. Meanwhile, the j
ether S..ntli Ani'-iiean conn! rios are apt |
I" iaU" ii"t !<?'.? thai. lira;:!! is in advanco
"t* th'-m in inoisuros which may enable
her !?> sit at the prrcat council which will
dotormin" th'.- peace uoKniiaiinns when
they corno.
(Copyright. 1017. by The Xationn.1 Edit
orial Service, Jno.)
inches apart in the rows. A plnf or
seed is sufficient for a hundred-foot
tow.
Lima beans, pole ? Plant in hills '?'>
to 4 foot apart for horse or hand ?:ul-(
tivation. A half pint of seed is stif- 1
tloietu for ahundre'd-fout row. Ijusti I
linias should bo planted in rows i"; J
feet apart lor hand cuI?ivatiou. or ".I
feet apart for horse cultivation. Space j
the seeds -ti to 10 inches apart in the
rows.
Cucumbers ? Plant ~ to 1" seeds in |
a hill, s.paeinu the hills 5 feet apart :
each way, and thin to - or 3 plants: !
or sow the seed in rows 4 to f> feet j
iipart. When planted in tows, the <
plants should he about 15 itu-hes apart I
lint the seed should he sowed much !
thicker, the plants beinir thinned!
later. A half ounce of seed is suffi
cient for ahundred-foot row.
Squash ? The bush varieties should!
he planted in hills -1 feet apart each j
way. and the running; varieties K to:
i 10 feet apart each way. One-halt
: ounce of seed is sufficient for a bun- j
' d red -foot row of either the bush or
j nninintr varieties.
I Muskmellons ? The culture of* the
1 musknielon is the same as the cu
i cumber except that .the plants are
! usually given more space. Plant S lol
in seeds in a hill, 'spaeins: tho hills H }
I feet apart t'ach way. Another method j
| is k> sow in drills fi feet apart and ,
thin to single plants IS to 21 inches'
apart.
I Watermelons ? The culture of the
I watermelon is the same as the musk
I melon except, that the plants require I
I more space Plant watermelons in ;
| rows S to 10 fee! apart and thin to!
I single plants " feet apart in the rows, j
| or plant in hijjs S to 10 feet apart i
each way. Announce of seed is suf
ficient for a hundred-foot row or for |
a dozen hills. I
Okra ? The rows should be 3 to I j
feet apart for the dwarf varieties and J
| -1 to ft feet apart for the al! kinds: Sow |
| the seed a few inches apart and thinj
j the plants to IS incite;;1 to 2 feet ;
j apart. Seven ounces of seed is stiff!- j
I cient for :i hundred-foot row.
I Sweet potatoes ? li is desirable to [
| have a row or two of sweet potatoes!
lin the home garden. Set the plants in!
j ridges :! lo 4 feet apart. Space the j
I plants 14 to IS inches apart. About !
j 7." plants will he required for a bun- 1
| dred-foot row.
i Tomatoes ? Set the plants (pur- 1
| chased or grown eat lv in hot beds t IS i
; inches apart in rows 2'L. to ?. feet i
j iipart. if they a re to be pruned Or1
; staked. If tlvy are to be on the!
ground, the distance should be 4 feet!
between rows and U feet in the rows.
Pruning a few branches and staking j
I are desirable in the home garden.
Eggplants ? Set the plants IS to 21
finches opart in rows 2 'A to " feet
["apart. A dozen good healthv plants'
I supply enough fruit for the average-'
sized family.
Peppers? Set the plants 1f> to IS
inches apart In rows 1'.. in feet
apart. A dozen plants should be suf
ficient.
Corn ? Plant closelv in drills ?. fee,
apart and thin to 10 or 14 inches in
the rows. If preferred, a dozen seeds
may be planted in hills 3 feet apart
AMERICA'S DELEGATE TO J
RUSSIAN republic; ?
I
JAMES DWOVK".
James Duncan, vice-president of the
American Federation of Labor, who
is the representative 'of American
labor on the commission which went
to Russia, headed by Elibu Root.
each way. and the plants thinned to
4 in each hill. Corn should he plant
ed in well-prepaid rich land.
Beets ? Sow jn rows 15 to 18 inches
apart for hand cultivation or 2 to
feet apart for ho'rs eeultivation. 'i'ne
plants should be thinned to 4 to 5 j
inches apart in' the rows.
Early cabbage ? Set the plants in
rows L' to 3 feet apart and 14 to 18
inches apart in the rows. Sixty-five
to f'U plants are required for a hun
dred-foot row.
crtmious wab rKAtrs.
ItOMK. .June 1">. ? A curious war fraud
was recently made known through the
eondemnatlon of u cavalry officcer to
l en years imprisonment. fn the early
part o.f tin; war the otrtcer was ahiieii^
???t to the duly of commandeering saddles ,
for cavalry use. lie was instructed to A
take saddles from civilian stables but, M
of course, to pay a fair price for them., M
Instead of giving orders to pay ^ on the' fl
department. hee himself paid spot cash 0
I'f >r saddles, usually one-fifth of their
value, and himself collected the' proper
price fr?>m the department, pockcting the
difference,
Veiiesii'da has ji tree th<* stem of
which contains -a milky fluid which flows
nut when a notch is cut. It, Is knowii
Irriijty as the cow tree or milk tree.
Ttie lead in sr winning horseowner In
M.-uIri"! is Senor San Miguel, whose win
nines at the meeting to December
amounted to over fl.KOrt. The King of
Spain (THnpto do Toledo) is second, with
t'l an ! the fond" tie la Oimene third
>\i'.h, roughly. Cl.lrtft.
Although only >'.!'7 races were run
In _lrcland_ last year, as romnnred with
T.'!7 in l'.t 15, stake money increased frOiA v. ?
t T -1.5717 to t70P">. the largest amount >
ever run for in Ireland in one season.
The number of horses running also in
creased from 1,361 to 1,394.