The Pensacola journal., October 19, 1919, Image 13

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THE yieTORY AT SEA
. , ' .v, -V:;;f By '
ormulating Naval Policy
Of the
low Plan to Utilize Destroyers as Patrol Was
Unfeasible Sime Worried Over U-Boat Sit
uation Necessity of Protecting Shipping:
Lanes East and South of Ireland.
Germany attacked our hospital
!ps In order to make us escort them
Jj destroyers, and thereby divert
destroyers from the antl-sub-ulne
campaign. And, of course,
gland had to do this. Had the An
Saxon mind resembled the Ger
in!o we should probably have ac
pted the logic of the situation, and
T8 refused to be diverted from the
fat strategio purpose which meant
.rating the war that Is. protecting
reliant shipping; we should, there-
r have left the hospital ships to
sir fate. Justifying ourselves by the
Inoiple of the larger good. But the
-itish and American mind does not
trie that way; It was Impossible for
i to leave sick and wounded men as
vt to submarines. Therefore, after
wiving the German warning, backed
its It was, by the actual destruc-
i of unprotected hospital ships, we
saa providing them with destroyer
worts. This greatly embarrassed us
the anti-submarine campaign, for at
-es, especially during the big drives.
: had & large number of hospital
!ps to protect. As soon as we adopt -
''. this policy, Germany, having at-
.ed her end. which was to keep the
s'-royers out of the submarine area.
pped attacking sick and wounded
r .fliers.
'ot only "was the British navy at
it time safeguarding the liberties of
unkind at sea, but its army in France
is doing its share in safeguarding
em on land. And the fact that Brlt
3 had to support this mighty army
i Its part In making British shipping
times almost the free play of the
firman submarines. For next in
jortance to maintaining the Brit-
si Grand Fleet Intact It was nec-
w&ry to keep secure the channel
"rowing. Over this little strip
t water "went the men and the
supplies -from England to France
Satiept the, German army at bay; to
v suspended this line of commu
tation, even for a brief period would
meant that the Germans would
ire captured Paris, overrun the
ff tVanA. flvtfl m-nAtkA 1A Hear
least the war on land. In the
3crse of four years Great Britain
-"Jasported about 20,000,000 troops
iffoes the channel, without the loss
a single man. She accomplished
J only by constantly using fifty or
it7 destroyers, and other light sur
craft, based on Harwich, as es-
Tts for the transports.' But this was
the only responsibility of the kind
rested on the already overbur
el British shoulders. Thers was
-other part of the seas In which, for
practical and Dolltlcal reasons, the
i'.iish destroyer fleet had to do pro-
"':vo duty. This was the Medlterra
a. Here lay not only the trade
-tes to the east, but also the lines
supply to Italy, to Egypt, to Pales
ana to MesoDotamla.
Cutting off Italy's food and materials
,3'J,a simply have meant that Italy
have to withdraw from the war.
9 German and Austrian subma-
escaolnar from Austria's Adriatic
-S. wpr - n fo ntW jiasalllnc this
amerce. Moreover, the success of
German submarine campaign In
-s waters would have meant that
' Ai.ies would have to abandon the
onlki expedition, which would have
1 we Central Powers absolute mas
of the Balkans and the (.Middle
This created an additional
ytln upon the anti-submarine craft
British navy,
"ot Enough Destroyers to Go
Around.
te British navy It was thus a
l:'iinr.' choIce wht areas she would
w &t y rrotect "with her destroyer
'.j aes: the ono thing that was painful
Pratent was that she could not
--Mon.y safeguard all the dan
tV With tho inadequate force
., f "'--Posal, certain aeras must be
tit V? to the U-boats; and. to de
v n r-1-
ones was simply a matter
mesne the several conflictine
tre.
SIS- Jn April, 191T, the Admiral
THE
States
ty had decided to give the preference
to the Grand Fleet, the hospital ships,
the channel crossing and the Mediter
ranean, practically in the order men
tioned. It is evident from the figures
given that all but about ten or a. dozen
destroyers must have been used in the
three areas. It was for this reason
that the great zone of trans -Atlantic
shipping, west and south of Ireland,
vitally Important as It was, had to go
almost unprotected. Sometimes only
four or five destroyers were operating
In this great stretch of waters; I do
not think the number ever exceeded
fifteen. Inasmuch as that represent
ed about the number of German sub
marines In this same area, the situ
ation may strike the novice as not
partlclarly desperate. But, of course,
any such basis of comnarlspn is ab
surd. The destroyers were operating
on the surface in full view of the sub
marines; the submarines could sub
merge , at any time and make them
selves Invisible; herein we have the
reason why the contest was ridiculous
ly unequal. . But, above all other con
siderations, the method of warfare
adopted by the Allies against the U
boat was fundamentally wrong. The
so-called submarine patrol, under the
circumstances which prevailed at that
time, could accomplish ' practically
nothing. This pathetlo little, fleet of
destroyers was based on Queenstown;
from this port the ships put forth and
patrolled In Ill-spent fashion around
the-English Channel and the waters
about Ireland in the hope that a Ger
man submarine would stick us nose
above the waves. The central iaea ot
the destroyer patrol Is the one of hunt
ing; the destroyer could sink the sub
marine or drive it away from shipping
if the submarine would only make itsj
presence known, and the business of j
the destroyer was to scury around in!
the forlorn hope that it would do so.!
Now this idea Is sound enough it you j
can have enough destroyers. We fig- j
ured that, to make the patrol system
work with complete success, we should .
have one destroyer for every J
square mile. The area of thedestroy-
er patrol off Queenstown comprised j
about 25,000 square miles; in other i
words the complete protection of the j
trans-Atlantic trade routes would
have . taken about 25,000 destroyers!;
And the British, as I have said, had
available anywhere from four to fif
teen in this area!
This destroyer flotilla being so small
It is not surprising that the German
submarines were making ducks and
drakes of it. The map of April sink
ings brings out art interesting fact:
numerous as these sinkings were, very
few merchantmen were torpedoed, In
this month, at the entrance to the
Irish Sea or In the English Channel.
These were the narrow waters where
shipping was massed, and where the
little destroyer patrol was intended
to operate. The German submarines
apparently avoided these waters, and
made their attacks but In the open
sea. sometimes two and three hundred
miles west and south of Ireland. Their
purpose in doing this was to draw the
destroyer patrol out into the open sea
and In that way cause its dispersal.
And these tactics succeeded. There
were six separate steamship "lanes"
by which the merchantmen approached
the English Channel and the Irish Sea.
One day the submarines would attack
along one of these lines; then the little
destroyer fleet would rush to this
scene of operations. Immediately the
German would depart and attack an
other route two or three hundred
miles away; then the destroyers would
go pell mell for that location. Just as
tKey arrived, however, the U-boats
would begin operating elsewhere; - and
so it went, a game of hide and seek in
which the advantages lay all on the
side of the submarines, which, pos
sessed that insuperable quality of in
visibility. It really was a case of
blind man's buff; the destroyer can
never see the enemy; the enemy could
United
PENS ACOLA JOURNAL, SUNDAY MORNING, OCTOBER 19, 1919.
always see' the destroyer.
Sims.
To show how serious the situation
was, let me quote from my reports
to Washington during this period. I
find statements like these . scattered
every where in my dispatches of the
if " Sl
spring of 1917: .'
."The military situation presented by
the enemy submarine campaign is not
only serious but critical."
"The outstanding fact which cannot
be escaped is that we are not succeed
ing, or in other words, that the ene
my's campaign is proving successful."
"The consequences of failure or par
tial failure of the Allied cause which
we have joined are of such a far-reach- ,
ing character that I am deeply con
cerned in insuring- that the part
played by our country shall stand ev
ery test of analysis before the bar of
history. The situation at , present is.
exceedingly grave. If sufficient United
States naval forces' can be thrown iri--to
the balance at the present critical
time and place .there is little doubt '
that' early success will be assured."
. "Briefly stated, I consider that, at
the present moment we are losing the
war." '
Deciding the American Naval Policy.
And now came another important
question: what should the American
naval policy be in this crisis? - There
were almost . as many, conflicting opin
ions as there were minds. Certain
authorities believed that our whole
North Atlantic Fleet should' be moved.
Such a manoeuvre ' was not only im
possible, but it would have been strat
egically very unwise; indeed such a
disposition' would have been - playing"
directly Into Germany's hands. What
naval experts call the 'logistics" of the
situation Immediately ruled this Idea
out of consideration. The simple fact
is that we could not have supplied our
dreadnaughts in European waters at
that time. The1 German U-boats were
making a particularly successful drive
at tankers, with the result that Eng-'
land had the utmost difficulty in sup
plying her fleet with fuel OIL It is
impossible to exaggerate the serious
ness of the oil situation at that time.
"Orders have Just been given to use
three-fifths speed, except in case of
emergency." I reported to Washington
on June -29, referring to the scarcity
of oiL "This simply means that the
enemy is winning the war." It was
lucky for us that the Germans knew
nothing about the scaricity of this in
dispensable fuel. Had they been aware
of it, they would have taken pains to
see that the Grand Fleet was constant
ly steaming at sea, and in this way
they might so have exhausted its oil
supplies as possibly to threaten . the
actual command of the' surface. For
tunately for the cause of civilization,
there were certain important facts
that the German secret service did not
learn.- '. '
But this oil shortness made It lmpos-
sibie that the American North At
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lantic Fleet should move Into Europe
an waters, at least at that time. Since
most oil supplies were brought from
America, we could not have fueled
our super-dreadnaughts In Europe in
the spring and summer of 1917.
Moreover, had we sent all our big
1
1
.1
ships to England we should have been
obliged to keep our destroyers con
stantly stationed with them ready for
a great sea action; this would have
completely fallen in with Germany's
plans, for then these destroyers could
not have been used against her subma-
9)
r.r
.
r
rines. The British did indeed request
that we send five coal-burning ships to
reinforce her fleet and give her that
preponderance which made its ascen
dency absolutely secure, and these
England could not -have made provis
ion for our greatest dreadnaughts, the
oil burners.. Indeed, our big ships
served the Allied cause better sta
tioned on this side than the- would
have served it had they been located
at a European base. They provided
a reserve, for the British fleet, precise
. ly as our armies in France provided
a reserve for the Allied armies; and
meanwhile their destroyer escorts could
be sent tof the submarine zone, to
participate 'in the anti-submarine
campaign. In American waters these
big ships could be kept in prime con
dition; here they had an open, free
, sea" for-training", and here they could
also "be used to " break in the thous
ands of new men needed for the new
ships constructed during the war. ,
: Our Fleet as Reinforcements.
I early : took : the stand that our
j forces should be considered chiefly In
tthe light, of reinforcements to the Al
lied navies, . and , that Ignoring all
question of national pride and even
what at first might superficially seem!
to be national interest, we should ex-
ert such offensive" power as we pos
sessed in the way that would best aa-J
sist the Allies in defeating the subma
rine. England's naval resources were
much greater than ours; in the nature
of the case . we . could not expect to
" maintain overseas anywhere near ,the
number of ships which England had
assembled; it should be our policy,
therefore to use such available units
as we . possessed to strengthen the
weak spots in the Allied line. . There
V were -those who believed that national
. dignity required that , we should build
? up an independent navy in European
waters, and operate It as' a distinct
American unit. But that, I maintained,
was" not the way to . win the war.
Had we adopted this course, we should
still have - been constructing naval
bases and perfecting an organization
."when the armistice was signed; ' ln-
- deed the Idea of. operating independent
ly of the Allied fleet was not for a mo-
tnent to" be considered.. There were
others " in America who thought it was
' unwise to. put any part of our fleet In
European waters, in view of the dan
: gers that might asail us on our own
coast. . : , . . v
'-There was every expectation that
- Germany would send submarines to
the Western Atlantic, where they
could prey upon our shipping and
possibly . bombard our ports; she bad
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plenty of submarines which couli
make this voyage, and the strateg)
of the situation, in April and ' May,
1917. demanded that a move of thii
kind be made. The predominant ele
ment in the submarine defense, as 1
have pointed out, was the destroyer.
The only way in which the United
States could Immediately and effect
ively help the British navy was by
sending our whole destroyer flotilla
and all our light surface craft at
once. It was Germany's part, there
fore, to resort to every manoeuvre that
would keep our destroyer force on
this side of the Atlantic. Such a
performance might be expected to
startle our peaceful American popu
lation and start a public cry for pro
tection that might force our govern
ment to keep all anti-submarine' craft
in our own waters. I expected Germa
ny to do this immediately, and cau
tioned our naval authorities at Wash
ington not to be deceived. I pointed
out that Germany could accomplish
practically nothing by sporadic at
tacks on American shipping in Amer
ican waters; that, indeed, if we could
induce the German admiralty to con
centrate all its submarine efforts on
the American coasts, and leave free
the Irish Sea and the English Chan
nel, the. war would be practically won
for the Allies. Yet these facts were
not apparent to the popular mind in
1917. and I shall always think that
Germany made a great mistake in
not fending submarines to the Ameri
can coast Immediately on our decla
ration of war, instead of waiting until
1918. Such attacks, at that time,
would have started a public demand
for protection which tho Washington
authorities might have had great dif
ficulty in resisting, and which might
have actually kept our destroyer fleet
In American waters, to the great det
riment of the Allied cause. Germany
evidently refrained from doing so for
reasons which I have already indica
ted a desire to play gently with tho
United States, and In that way to de
lay our. military preparations and win
the war without coming into bloody
conflict with the American people.
There were others who thought it
unwise to expose any part of our fleet
to the dangers of. the European con
test; their fear was that, if the Allies
should be defeated, we would then
need all our naval forces to protect
the American coast. This point of
view, of course, was short sighted and
absurd. Clearly our national policy
demanded that we should exert all
the force we could assemble to make
certain a German defeat.
The best way to fight Germany was
not to wait until she had vanquished
the Allies, but to Join hands with them
in a combined effort to beat her down.
The thing to do was vigorously to
take the offensive: to make certain
that Germany could not attack us at
h'ome by destroying her naval power
In European waters.
The Vital' Waters West and South Of
Ireland.
The fact Is that no nation was ever
placed in so tragical a position as
Great Britain In the spring and early
summer of 1917. And I think that his
tory records few spectacles more hero
ic than that of the great British navy,
fighting this hideous and cowardly
form of warfare In half a dozen nlao
with pitifully inadequate forces, but
with an undaunted spirit that re
mained firm even against the fearful
odds which I have described. What
an opportunity for America! And It
was perfectly apparent what we
should do. We should lmmedlatly
place all available anti-submarine
craft In those waters west and south
of Ireland, the headquarters of the
shipping which meant life or death
to the Allied, cause the area which
England, because of the almost end
less demands on her navy in othtr
fields, was unable to protect.
I spent my first four days In Lon
don collecting all possible data; I
had no desire to alarm Washington
unwarrantably, yet I also believed that
I should be dereflct did I not present
the facta precisely as they were. I.
therefore, consulted praetically every
one who could give me essential de
tails and wrote a cable despatch, fill
ing four fool's cap pages, which fur
nished Washington its first detailed
account of the cause on which we had
emfoarked. In this work I had the full
cooperation, of our Ambassador In
London. Mr. Walter Hines Page. Mr.
Page's whole heart and mind were
bound up in the Allied cause; he was
zealous that his country would play
worthily Its part In this great crisis
In history; and he worked unsparing
ly with me to get the facts before the
Washington Administration.